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ABSTRACT
Knowledge of circumstances under which past service provi-
sions have occurred enables clients to make more informed
selection decisions regarding their future interaction part-
ners. Service providers, however, may often be reluctant
to release such circumstances due to the cost and effort re-
quired, or to protect their interests. In response, we intro-
duce a reputation-based incentivisation framework, which
motivates providers towards the desired behaviour of re-
porting circumstances via influencing two reputation-related
factors: the weights of past provider interactions, which di-
rectly impact the provider’s reputation estimate, and the
overall confidence in such estimates.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A service-oriented marketplace can be seen as a dynamic
marketplace where individuals interact to achieve their goals.
Besides the outcomes of past interactions, knowledge of the
circumstances under which interactions took place gives in-
dividuals useful (more sufficient) information to support their
decision making in selecting a future interaction partner.
The PROV standard [3] (published by W3C as a standard
for interoperable provenance) provides a suitable solution
for exposing information on various circumstances underly-
ing a service provision. A PROV document describes in a
queryable form the causes and effects within a particular
past process of a system as a directed graph with anno-
tations. The contents of a provenance graph can be col-
lated from data recorded by a set of independent agents,
and clients have a standard means to query the data.
Providers are the obvious source of such provenance data,
as it is a record of how they provided a service, but they
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may not be willing to release such records for several rea-
sons. This may be due to the additional burden incurred
on the provider side (the process of provenance recording
and documentation could be tedious and expensive), or for
competitive grounds (e.g. it may be against provider inter-
ests to release records showing that they performed poorly).
Targeting providers with relevant incentives is a promising
way to encourage them to release provenance data. In the
context of service-oriented marketplaces, reputation is a par-
ticularly attractive (extrinsic) incentive for service providers
since it has a direct effect on their chances of being selected
by clients. Based on this, a reputation-based incentivisation
framework is investigated in this paper.
2. INCENTIVISATION FRAMEWORK
To influence a provider towards provision of (true) cir-
cumstances reports, the incentivisation mechanism in place
(reputation-based in our case) should allow the provider to
gain some utility in response. Existing reputation mecha-
nisms provide a reputation score to compare providers, usu-
ally estimated from ratings given by past customers. An
intuitive approach would thus be to allow the circumstances
given by the provider to influence such a score via influenc-
ing the weight of these ratings. In fact, when circumstances
are available, such an approach seems necessary to ensure
accurate assessments of provider reputation for clients. In
many cases, this also brings benefits to reputation from the
provider perspective. Consider a provider who fails to de-
liver some goods on time on a day when an unexpected trans-
port strike occurs. Such a failure can potentially harm the
provider’s reputation, but is out of the provider’s control.
Thus, it is advantageous for the provider to justify this fail-
ure via revealing the mitigating circumstances that occurred,
to allow for its effect on reputation to be discounted.
Yet, there may be other cases where exposure of circum-
stances would not benefit a provider’s reputation (e.g. the
provider consistently delivers a good performance, so report-
ing circumstances or reporting their absence would only in-
cur an additional cost without additional benefit). More-
over, such an approach (i.e. weighting past ratings by re-
leased circumstances) may also motivate providers towards
the undesired behaviour of supplying untrue information
(e.g. a provider may claim untrue mitigating circumstances
in order to justify their occasional poor performance and
thus avoid reputation losses).
To discourage these deception opportunities (i.e. omitted
or misleading information by providers), a provider’s circum-
stances provision behaviour should have an effect on another
reputation related factor. We argue that a plausible factor is
the confidence in the weights assigned to ratings, influencing
in turn the overall confidence in the reputation score. The
intuition behind this is as follows. When the circumstances
underlying a rating are withheld, the rating’s relevence for
the current situation is uncertain, which should be reflected
via a low confidence in the weight assigned for the rating.
Similarly, if the circumstances report is provided, but is sus-
picious (suspicious reports can be detected by confirming
them against those provided by others in the population),
the confidence in the respectively calculated weight for the
rating should also be reduced. The overall confidence in the
reputation score for a provider could have an important im-
pact on the decision making of the client, and a provider
with a low confidence could potentially be placed lower in
the ranking list despite having a good reputation score.
3. EVALUATION
We conducted an agent-based simulation, which proceeds
in rounds, each involving three phases: client reconsidera-
tion; service provision; and provider reconsideration. In the
client reconsideration phase, each client selects an interac-
tion partner for the current round from the n most reputable
service providers (with an exploration probability). To de-
termine a provider reputation, the client utilises FIRE [2]
as the base reputation mechanism, augmented with the pro-
posed extension, with the overall ranking score of a provider
being a combination of the provider’s respective reputation
and confidence scores. In the service provision phase, each
client receives a service from the selected provider, and rates
this service according to their satisfaction. Here, we consider
freak events as potential circumstances affecting provision of
services, as a result of which providers deliver their services
at lower quality levels. In the provider reconsideration, each
provider observes the profit achieved (in terms of the num-
ber of client requests received) in the current round following
its previous circumstances provision decision, compares this
profit against the cost incurred (0 if no circumstances report
is provided, and a negative cost otherwise), and adjusts its
action policies accordingly through a form of q-learning [1].
Here, we assume two possible states, occurrence of a freak
event, denoted by s+, and no occurrence of freak events,
denoted by s−, with three possible provider actions at each
state: reporting correct information (ci), reporting false in-
formation (fi), and withholding information (wi). The goal
is to push the provider’s behaviour towards action ci, which
corresponds to reporting a freak event occurrence (for state
s+), and reporting no freak event occurrence (for state s−).
Figures 1(a) and 1(b) illustrate the results obtained (av-
eraged over 100 simulation runs, each involving 50 service
providers and 100 clients, with a duration of 2000 rounds).
The proposed incentivisation strategy achieves the desired
provider behaviour, increasing the probability of action ci to
a high level in both states s+ and s−. In particular, in state
s− (Figure 1(a)), withholding information is not a favourable
action since it lowers the confidence in the provider’s rep-
utation estimate, and consequently decreases the provider’s
overall ranking. Action fi is not beneficial in this state,
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Figure 1: Incentivisation with Circumstance-aware
Weighting and Circumstance-aware Confidence
leading to favouring action ci (i.e. reporting freak events ab-
sence), where the boost in confidence achieved via reporting
correct information (verified by comparing this information
with other providers) compensates for the negative utility of
information provision. The same applies for state s+ (Fig-
ure 1(b)). Here, the decrease in confidence from chosing
actions wi or fi further lowers the ranking (and thus the se-
lection chances) of the provider affected by the freak event,
while choosing action ci (i.e. reporting the freak event) pro-
vides a double benefit (discounting the impact of affected
interactions on reputation, and increasing confidence).
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